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Abstract 
 
This paper examines the effects of the success of the Patriot missile system in the 
1991 Gulf War on Senate roll call votes for the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI).  
Previous studies have shown that both Party Identification (PID) and Ideology have 
had a significant effect on senators' votes on defense weapons systems. Using Logit 
regression techniques, this paper examines whether PID and Ideology, both of 
which are central to political identity, remained significant factors in three Senate 
votes on SDI; this paper is unique compare to previous studies of such matters in 
that it adds two additional explanatory variables to existing models: (1) the extent 
to which each state might benefit from SDI and (2) whether or not the senator from 
each state was up for re-election in 1992  It is hypothesized that the findings will 
suggest that external factors played a role in the SDI Senate votes in question. 
Specifically, it is hypothesized that the effects of the Gulf War Patriot missile 
successes led to greater legislative support (compared to support levels from 
previous years) for the Strategic Defense Initiative among Democrats, those 
senators whose states would benefit from SDI funding, and those senators seeking 
re-election. 
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Background 
 
  Conventional wisdom argues that a congressman's vote on defense issues can be 
predicted based on both his political ideology (which is presumed to directly shape personal 
opinion) and the potential benefit to his state.  Most research, however, has tended to confirm the 
influence of only the former while disproving the significance of the latter (McCormick, 1985; 
McCormick & Black, 1983; Ray, 1981; Russett, 1970; Wayman, 1985). Findings have been 
similar in studies focused on predictions of how congressional members would vote on specific 
weapons systems. Again, the effects of ideology were found to have significant influence on 
such votes, whereas the potential benefits to a congressman’s state were found to have no 
significant influence on his vote on such matters (Bernstein & Anthony, 1974; Fleisher, 1985). 
  The consistency of the finding of no significance between state benefit and voting 
outcomes with respect to weapons systems is surprising. Members of Congress are often 
suggested to behave parochially; that is, they are believed to have a strong incentive to garner 
benefits for their constituents out of a sense of self-interest (Fiorina, 1974; Mayhew 1974). While 
this does not appear to be the case with respect to support for weapons systems in particular, 
some studies have suggested that there are parochial effects on defense programs such as military 
bases (Arnold, 1979; Twight, 1989, 1990) and some operations and maintenance programs 
(Carter 1989; Higgs, 1988). 
  Much of the research on weapons systems has focused on anti-Ballistic missile systems 
(ABM) in general and the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) specifically. James Lindsay (1990 
and 1991) has tested the factors that influence voting on issues relating to SDI in both the House 
and the Senate and has consistently found strong support for ideology as a predictor of Senate 
votes and no significant support for the effects of parochialism. While Lindsay appears to have 
put the final nail in the coffin against the parochialism hypothesis on weapons systems voting, 
his studies may not be conclusive on such matters for two reasons: First, both of his studies 
reflect congressional voting during the Cold War. Additionally, his studies have not considered 
the possible effects of international events swaying votes in one direction or another. 
  This study is, therefore, intended to follow up on the work of Lindsay and others on the 
study of weapons systems voting by examining roll call voting on SDI in the Senate in 1991. The 
choice of this particular year is intentional.  The Gulf War was fought and won in January and 
February of 1991, and the American public and Congress witnessed the great success of 
American soldiers not only on the battlefield but also in the skies above it. Specifically, a 
modified surface-to-air missile (SAM) known as the Patriot helped to shield U.S. troops and 
Israeli civilians from incoming Scud missiles. The perceived success of the Patriot in its service 
as an ABM device led to a new ground-swell of support in favor of developing a real ABM 
system for the defense of the United States. This support centered around the Bush 
administrations' Global Protection against Limited Strikes (GPALS) program. GPALS was a 
scaled-down version of President Reagan's original SDI vision. 
   As a result of this new bipartisan support for such a program, Congress passed the 
Missile Defense Act in 1991. This act called upon the Defense Department to develop the 
necessary missiles, radars, and sensors on satellites for an ABM system that would be compliant 
with the 1972 ABM Treaty. The National Missile Defense Act further ordered that the system be 
ready "by the earliest date allowed by the availability of appropriate technology or by fiscal year 
1996."
1 Congress also endorsed a "robust" program for follow-up technologies, including 
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external guidance. Finally, the act also called for talks with the Soviet Union on amending the 
ABM Treaty. 
  Despite bipartisan support, the Bush administration seemed unsure of how it should react 
to the passing of the MDA. First it delayed the initial deployment date by a year. Then it told 
Congress it did not want the first ground-based interceptor site at Grand Forks, and proceeded to 
squander half a year renegotiating.
2 This was a costly mistake by the administration. By the time 
authorization and appropriations got underway, support for the MDA had decayed considerably. 
A number of senators who had supported the MDA in 1991 turned their backs on it in 1992. The 
opportunity the Gulf War had provided was lost as a result of the Bush administration's poor 
handling of the momentum the war had granted them on the ABM system front. 
  The question remains, then, why did such hearty support in 1991 wane by 1992?  This 
paper proposes that in 1991, senators were responding to the support of the public for missile 
defenses, spurred by the Gulf War. This hypothesis is based on the results of a poll conducted by 
the Worthern group in January of 1991, which found that when the American public was asked 
to agree or disagree with the following statement:  "Spending billions of dollars for sophisticated 
weapons in the 1980s was worth the cost because with those weapons we [saved] the lives of 
thousands of American troops in the war against Iraq," 85% agreed, and only 14% disagreed. In 
this paper, the hypothesis that the external Gulf War events influenced senators' voting on SDI is 
tested by examining three Senate votes on SDI. In addition, added to the three variables 
previously used by Lindsay (ideology, parochialism, and PID), this paper will consider the 
additional variable of the prospect of re-election for each senator. This re-election variable is 
used in an attempt to capture the effects of the Gulf War by suggesting that senators up for re-
election were more likely to support SDI funding because it was politically popular to do so after 
the Gulf War. 
 
Data and Methods 
 
  Three Senate votes (Votes 171, 172, and 173) on SDI serve as the dependent variables in 
this study.  Senate vote 171 was a motion to kill a proposed amendment to cut $1.4 billion from 
the $4.6 billion authorized for SDI and to prohibit any funding for the space-based interceptors 
program. Senate vote 172 was a motion to kill an amendment to prohibit the deployment of the 
ground-based ABM system at Grand Forks, ND. Senate vote 173 was an amendment to cut $1 
billion in funding authorized for SDI.  The pro-SDI position won in all three instances. 
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Table One: Description of the Dependent and Independent Variables 
____________________________________________________________ 
V a r i a b l e       D e s c r i p t i o n  
____________________________________________________________ 
 
Senate Vote 171        Vote to kill the Harkin        
                 amendment which would cut $1.4      
      billion  of  the  $4.6  billion       
                 authorized for SDI and        
                 prohibits funding for the        
                 space-based interceptors        
                 program.  Motion passed:  60-     
                 38.  A "yea" vote was a vote       
                 supporting the president's                       
      position.    08-01-91. 
 
Senate Vote 172        Vote to kill Harkin amendment      
      to  prohibit  the  deployment  of       
      the  ground-based  anti-    
                 ballistic missile system at        
                 Grand Forks, ND.  Motion        
      agreed  to:    64-34.    A  "yea"       
                 vote was a vote supporting the      
      president's  position.    08-01-91. 
 
Senate Vote 173        Bumpers Amendment to cut $1          
    billion  of  the  $4.6  billion       
             authorized for the Strategic        
             Defense Initiative and        
             transfer savings to reducing        
          the deficit.  Rejected:  46-52.       
        A "nay" vote was a vote supporting the    
        President’s  position.    08-01-91. 
 
PID       1  =  Republican; 
      0   =   D e m o c r a t .  
 
Ideology      Scaled  NSI  score  (0-100) 
 
Benefit       State  Financial  Benefit  from  SDI. 
      1  =  Monetary  Benefit; 
      0  =  No  Monetary  Benefit. 
 
Election      Whether  Senator  was up for Re-Election in 1992. 
      1   =   U p   f o r   R e - E l e c t i o n  
      0  =  Not  Up  for  Re-Election. Senate Voting On the Strategic Defense Initiative: The Impact of the 1991 Gulf War 
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  Four variables are used in an attempt to gauge why senators supported these measures in 
1991. The first of these is a dichotomous variable measuring party identification. Democrats are 
coded "0," and Republicans are coded "1."  It is theorized that those senators of the president's 
party (Republican) will be more likely to support the pro-SDI position than will Democrats. SDI 
and defense-related issues in general are considered by most Americans to fall under the auspices 
of the Republican Party. Second, a variable measuring each senator's individual ideology is used. 
The senators’ ideologies are quantified using the 1990 National Security Index (NSI) scores for 
senators. The NSI prepared by the American Security Council (ASC), rates members on their 
support of defense and foreign policy issues.  Scores range from 0 (dovish) to 100 (hawkish). It 
is believed that as the scale number rises, so too does an individual’s support for SDI. Third, a 
variable measuring partisan benefit is included.  This serves to re-test the parochialism 
hypothesis. The state benefit variable is scored as "1" for those states expected to receive some 
form of financial benefit (or “pork”) from SDI and "0" for those not expected to receive SDI 
such "pork." It is expected that senators whose states will receive financial benefit from SDI 
funding will be more likely to support SDI. Finally, a variable measuring whether a senator is up 
for re-election is added.  It is a simple dichotomous variable scored "0" for those senators not up 
for re-election and "1" for those who are up for re-election. It is expected that senators due to 
face the voters in 1992 were more likely to support SDI. These four independent variables were 
then regressed against the three individual roll call votes on SDI. Logistic regression was used 
because the dependent variables were dichotomous. 
 
Findings 
 
  Table two presents the findings of all three votes. The first vote (Vote 171) shows both 
the re-election and the ideology variables to be significant. The PID and state benefit 
(parochialism) variables are found to be insignificant. This is as expected.   
 
Table Two: Logit Regression of 1991 Senate SDI Votes  
_________________________________________________________ 
 
Vote Number:      171       172       173 
____________________________________________________________ 
       
Constant   -2.6245 -1.7765 -2.6156 
   (.6831)   (.5670)   (.6537) 
 
PID    .9081   -.2363   0.8638 
   (.9322)   (.9610)   (.7551) 
 
Ideology   .0514*** .0518*** .0435***   
   (.0116)   (.0125)   (.0101) 
 
Benefit      -.1842   -.8179   -.3031 
   (.7315)   (.6851)   (.6588) 
 
Election   1.1414* 1.1531*   .6858 Journal of International and Global Studies 
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   (.0716)   (.0684)   (.6347) 
 
Pseudo-R2   .3986   .5060   .4687 
 
-2 log likelihood  61.642   67.996   74.044 
 
Goodness of Fit  64.960           100.376   86.445  
 
N:        98   98   98 
___________________________________________________________ 
 
Note:  Standard Errors are in parentheses 
*p   < .10, one-tailed test 
**p  < .05, one-tailed test 
***p < .01, one-tailed test 
 
   Vote 171 calls for a motion to kill proposed cuts in SDI spending and prohibits funding 
for space-based interceptors.  If there is a Gulf War effect, then senators' responses to Vote 171 
should be to support SDI. While ideology remains the strongest predictor of Senate voting on 
weapons issues, the significance of the election variable suggests that there was indeed such an 
effect: senators up for re-election were doing what they considered to be politically popular by 
voting in support of full funding for SDI, which was popular among their constituents at that 
time, following the success of the Gulf War. In the second vote (Vote 172), logistic regression 
likewise indicates that along with ideology, the re-election variable is shown to have exercised 
an influence on senators’ votes. The logic following the previous vote applies here as well:  
senators were simply moving with the majority in order to gain favor with their constituents 
preceding re-election. The results of the final logistic regression on Vote 173 are slightly 
different from the first two. Notably, the re-election variable drops out of significance.  Ideology, 
however, maintains its significant status. The likely reason the election variable drops from 
significance with this vote is because it is worded to promote cutting SDI funding as a means to 
reduce the federal deficit. Few things are more popular with the public than cutting the deficit, 
and ABM defenses are certainly not among them.  
  These findings suggest that while ideology is still the strongest predictor of Senate voting 
on weapons issues, there are potential effects related to the Gulf War and the seeking of 
constituent support in the face of re-election that directly influenced senators’ votes. In short, the 
prospect of facing the voters spurred a large number of senators to adopt a pro-SDI stance. It can 
be assumed that this was a result of the success of the Patriot missiles in the 1991 Gulf War. 
Additionally, these findings bolster support for the idea that international events can have a 
strong effect on legislators' votes. These external effects have long been neglected in the 
literature. This study has shown, however, that such effects are most likely present, manifesting 
themselves in Senate voting.  
  A second notable result of this study has been to show that there was general bipartisan 
support for the SDI program, and as such, PID alone was not a sufficient predictor in 
determining how a senator would vote in any of the three cases examined. This is surprising, 
considering the fact that SDI is generally considered to be a Republican-favored program and 
because other studies have shown PID to have had a significant effect on legislative voting on Senate Voting On the Strategic Defense Initiative: The Impact of the 1991 Gulf War 
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weapons systems (Lindsay, 1990). The relative unreliability of PID to predict voting outcomes in 
the case of these three votes seems to indicate that the external events in 1991 (i.e. the Gulf War) 
curbed Democratic distaste for the program. Indeed, the lack of such partisan voting suggests 
that mutual support for the program arose out of the successes of the Patriot missile system. 
  Finally, the results of the analysis of the three votes conducted in this study reveal no 
significant state benefit (parochial) motivation behind voting outcomes. The continued 
insignificance of parochialism provides even more proof that parochialism itself is simply not a 
significant factor when senators make decisions on weapons systems. (Still, why parochialism or 
the pursuit of state benefits by individual senators did not increase following the Gulf War 
remains unclear. It would seem that the growth in bipartisan support the Patriot missile fostered 
for SDI would have lead senators to have taken the opportunity to vote on behalf of their 
constituents, but such voting apparently did not occur at a significant level.) 
 
Impact 
 
  Did this burst of support for a limited ballistic missile defense system in fact produce 
such a system? It did not. The George H.W. Bush administration, likely distracted by the 
recession and then 1992 election, did not capitalize on the bipartisan congressional support for 
such a system. Bush’s defeat by Bill Clinton effectively ended the development efforts for a 
ballistic missile defense shield for the next eight years.  George W. Bush, however, seemingly 
intent on finishing much of the old business his father had started, renewed US efforts to produce 
a defense shield. The second Bush administration withdrew the United States from the 1972 
ABM Treaty in June 2002, and in December 2002, President George W. Bush signed National 
Security Presidential Directive 23, which outlined a plan to deploy a national missile defense 
system beginning in 2004. Most of the effort to deploy a functional system, however, was 
focused on placing systems in Poland, the Czech Republic, and Romania. President Obama 
subsequently scrapped plans to place ballistic missile defense systems in Eastern Europe in favor 
of locating the interceptors on US Navy vessels. 
The march toward a viable national missile defense system for the United States has been 
slow. While some degree of ballistic missile threat has existed for the US homeland since 1950, 
the will to construct a defensive system to protect the country has been weak. This tepidness 
largely results from the high cost of deploying an effective system and the underlying attitude 
that the US homeland is not threatened. This latter attitude likely will change as nuclear 
proliferation continues and as the range of ballistic missiles in the hands of rogue states grows to 
threaten US territory. Aversions to cost might be overcome if members of Congress believe such 
an investment would produce an effective system.   
What this means for contemporary politics is that the ongoing threat of nuclear 
proliferation might translate into congressional support for a ballistic missile defense program if 
the potential effectiveness of such a system is demonstrated during a conflict situation. The 
looming conflict with Iran could provide such a scenario. If Israel attempts to destroy or degrade 
Iran’s ability to build nuclear weapons, Iran may respond with ballistic missile attacks against 
Israel. Israel has a variety of anti-ballistic missile systems in place (Arrow, Iron Dome, David’s 
Sling), built with US assistance, and, if effective, these systems could renew calls in the US 
Congress for a deployment of similar systems here. 
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Conclusions 
 
  Did the Gulf War affect senators' voting on the SDI? This study argues that it did, 
employing logistic regression to test whether four variables influenced senators' votes on three 
SDI-related votes. The findings suggest that while ideology is still the strongest predictor of 
legislative voting on weapons systems, the presence of an upcoming Senate election was also a 
significant factor in determining Senate votes on two occasions.  Senators appear to have been 
responding to their constituents' desire for continued support of ABM programs. This, coupled 
with the finding that PID was an insignificant factor in determining Senate voting, suggests that 
the Gulf War success of the Patriot missile created real bipartisan support for the SDI program. 
As was mentioned earlier, however, this support was short in duration. The minds of the 
American public quickly turned from ABM defenses to fixing the economy. The Gulf War was 
forgotten, and bipartisan support for the SDI program was lost. 
  Thus, it is accurate to argue that President Bush lost a real opportunity to push through a 
deployment scheme for an actual BMD system. The Bush administration, by dragging its feet, 
allowed congressional support for the program to wane as the memories of the success of the 
Patriot missile fleeted into the past. This study has shown that (1) the Senate would have 
supported a deployment effort of an SDI in 1991 because of external influences, and (2) the 
overwhelming support of President Bush and the U.S. military following the Gulf War led 
senators to adopt a more bipartisan perspective regarding SDI. 
  Further study of the effects of external influences on Senate voting is needed.  The effects 
suggested by this study may actually be indirect with respect to their effects on Senate voting 
because Senators were probably responding not only to the external influence of the Gulf War 
but also to the support of their constituents for the SDI program. As such, some combination of 
X and Y were likely at play (resulting bipartisan voting) a relationship that would merit further 
study. What remains without question is that the Gulf War led to increased public support for 
ballistic missile defense, as illustrated by bipartisan senator support for SDI programs in three 
Senate votes in 1991.   
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